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The Proper Province of Philosophy: 




The practice of conceptual analysis has undergone a revival in recent years. Although the extent 
of its role in philosophy is controversial, many now accept that conceptual analysis has at least 
some role to play. Granting this, I consider the relevance of empirical investigation to conceptual 
analysis. I do so by contrasting an extreme position (anti-empirical conceptual analysis) with a 
more moderate position (non-empirical conceptual analysis). I argue that anti-empirical 
conceptual analysis is not a viable position because it has no means for resolving conceptual 
disputes that arise between seemingly competent speakers of the language. This is illustrated by 
considering one such dispute that has been pressed by a prominent advocate of anti-empirical 
conceptual analysis: Bennett and Hacker (2003) assert that psychological predicates only 
logically apply to whole living animals, but many scientists and philosophers use the terms more 
broadly. I argue that to resolve such disputes we need to empirically investigate the common 
understanding of the terms at issue. I then show how this can be done by presenting the results of 
three studies concerning the application of “calculates” to computers. 
 
 
 Conceptual analysis as a topic of philosophical discussion has seen something of a 
resurgence over the past decade. Much of this resurgence owes to Frank Jackson’s (1998) 
defense of the practice. He argues that conceptual analysis is both more important and more 
common than has recently been thought (see also Jackson (1994), Bealer (1987, 1998), Lewis 
(1994); see Laurence and Margolis (2003) for a critical discussion). Defenses like Jackson’s raise 
a host of questions about just how important conceptual analysis is to philosophy and how 
frequently it should be employed. Accepting that it has at least some role to play, however, I 
want to focus on a subsequent question about its application: What role, if any, should empirical 
investigation play in conceptual analysis? Specifically, I will consider the role of empirical 
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investigation in laying out the primary meaning2 of a term for a concept that occurs in a 
conceptual analysis. 
 Focusing on the analysis of ordinary concepts (non-technical concepts), there are any 
number of positions that one could defend with regard to this question. At one extreme, you 
could argue that conceptual analysis should always be supported by empirical research, 
potentially requiring philosophers to carry out the relevant experiments themselves if the existing 
literature is silent on the question (think of this as experimental philosophy run wild); more 
moderately, you could hold that it is good practice to offer empirical evidence in support of 
relatively important or contentious bits of conceptual analysis, preferably at the time you employ 
them. At the other extreme, you could assert that empirical research has no role to play in 
conceptual analysis, arguing that it is essentially irrelevant to the practice. Call this anti-
empirical conceptual analysis (AECA). More moderately, you could allow that empirical 
research has some role to play in conceptual analysis, but hold that it is not generally needed and 
deny that it is incumbent on the practitioner to conduct an objective investigation. Call this non-
empirical conceptual analysis (NECA).3 
 In this paper I investigate the divide between NECA and AECA by considering a 
proponent of each position. I will treat Frank Jackson (1998) as an advocate of NECA. While 
Jackson is open to the use of empirical work in conceptual analysis, he does not think that it is 
typically needed. In contrast, Max Bennett and Peter Hacker (2003) seem to support AECA, 
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denying that empirical work has any role to play in conceptual analysis. My primary goal is to 
show that in denying the relevance of empirical work to conceptual analysis, AECA has no 
compelling way to adjudicate between diverging assertions, made by seemingly competent 
speakers of the language, about the meaning of a term occurring in a conceptual analysis. I hold 
that this is a rather serious shortcoming and illustrate the point by considering an actual example 
of such a dispute, namely, the disagreement over the use of psychological predicates that is at the 
center of Bennett and Hacker’s (2003, 2007) critique of language use in modern neuroscience. 
This dispute concerns two plausible hypotheses about the primary meanings of psychological 
predicates: Bennett and Hacker assert that these terms are restricted to whole living animals, but 
the scientists and philosophers that Bennett and Hacker critique do not abide by this restriction. It 
seems that one of these parties must be mistaken in their assessment of the primary meanings of 
these terms (assuming with Bennett and Hacker that the second party intends to be using these 
terms in accord with their primary meanings).  
 The question that will concern us is how we can resolve such disputes. As proponents of 
both NECA and AECA hold that the primary meanings of common terms can be elicited from 
how they are understood in the general linguistic community, it seems that the obvious way to 
resolve such disputes is to go out into the community and empirically investigate how people 
understand the terms. In fact, I hold that this is the only convincing way to adjudicate between 
opposed statements of the primary meaning of a common term given by two speakers of the 
language that otherwise seem to be competent. To illustrate, I present the results of three studies 
assessing one of the specific claims made by Bennett and Hacker (namely, that computers cannot 
literally be said to calculate). 
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 Here is how I will proceed. In Section 1, I articulate the conception of conceptual 
analysis that I will be working with and detail the position of NECA as found in Jackson (1998). 
In Section 2, I articulate the contrasting position of AECA, focusing on the reasons that Bennett 
and Hacker (2003) give for denying that empirical inquiry is relevant to the practice of 
conceptual analysis. In Section 3, I raise the problem of conceptual disputes for AECA. The 
problem is illustrated via Bennett and Hacker’s claim that psychological predicates only logically 
apply to whole living animals. In Section 4, I briefly discuss a range of empirical studies 
concerning the folk psychology of consciousness that speak against Bennett and Hacker’s 
assessment of the primary meanings of some psychological predicates. In Section 5, I then 
present the results of the three studies that I conducted to test the application of “calculate” to 
computers. I argue that these studies are not only compelling evidence against Bennett and 
Hacker, but show how careful experimental work can be used to resolve disputes that arise in the 
practice of conceptual analysis. I conclude that AECA is not a viable position and draw a lesson 
from this for NECA. 
 
1. Conceptual Analysis 
There is not perfect agreement about what the practice amounts to between the advocates of 
conceptual analysis that I will consider. Nonetheless, I find that a few central themes are largely 
shared and I will focus on these in the discussion that follows. In particular, conceptual analysis 
generally concerns articulations of the primary meanings of common terms that are of 
philosophical interest. These meanings are thought to reflect how the terms are typically 
understood in the general linguistic community, leading to a concern with how they are 
ordinarily used. Thus, Max Bennett and Peter Hacker (2003, 6), for example, are “concerned 
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with the misuse of old, non-technical concepts”; they are concerned with a term for a common or 
garden concept being used “contrary to its ordinary use.” They hold that nonsense often results 
from such misuse, writing: 
How can one investigate the bounds of sense? Only by examining the use of words. 
Nonsense is often generated when an expression is used contrary to the rules for its use. 
The expression in question may be an ordinary, non-technical expression, in which case 
the rules for its use can be elicited from its standard employment and received 
explanations of its meaning. (6)4 
 
Following the Wittgensteinian slogan that meaning is use, Bennett and Hacker hold that the 
primary meaning of a common term is found in how that term is used in the general linguistic 
community. 
 Frank Jackson is not so concerned with identifying the misuse of terms and instead 
motivates conceptual analysis via “the importance of defining one’s subject” (1998, 30). 
Nonetheless, this also leads to a concern with what he calls the “ordinary conception” of a given 
common term (this is essentially its primary meaning). Jackson writes: 
What then are the interesting philosophical questions that we are seeking to address when 
we debate the existence of free action and its compatibility with determinism, or about 
eliminativism concerning intentional psychology? What we are seeking to address is 
whether free action according to our ordinary conception, or something suitably close to 
our ordinary conception, exists and is compatible with determinism, and whether 
intentional states according to our ordinary conception, or something suitably close to it, 
will survive what cognitive science reveals about the operations of our brains. (31) 
 
The scope of the “our” in this passage is not just philosophers, but the linguistic community 
more generally. Thus, Jackson equates our ordinary conception of free will, for example, with 
the folk theory of it (32). His goal is to articulate the folk theory and he holds that this can be 
done by considering people’s intuitions about the applicability of the term for the folk concept in 
                                                 
4 My primary concern will be with the claim, detailed in the following section, that we can examine the use of 
common terms without empirically investigating how those terms are employed in the linguistic community. While 
Bennett and Hacker might seem to suggest such an investigation in this passage, they actually hold that there is no 
need for competent speakers of the language to examine how other people in the linguistic community use those 
terms. 
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various possible cases. In this way, like Bennett and Hacker, Jackson is concerned with how 
people use the relevant terms, drawing this out by considering different scenarios. 
 Jackson’s focus on intuitions about the applicability of a term in various possible cases is 
typical in the practice of conceptual analysis. Antti Kauppinen terms these intuitions, conceptual 
intuitions; these are defined (roughly speaking) as our “pre-theoretical dispositions to apply 
concepts to some particular cases or scenarios and to refuse to apply them to others” (2007, 96). 
Accepting that the primary meanings of philosophically interesting common terms are reflected 
in the shared conceptual intuitions of members of the linguistic community, this gives us a 
succinct way to distinguish between the positions of AECA and NECA. We can distinguish 
between them in terms of the extent of the role that their advocates assign to empirical 
investigation for purposes of showing that one’s own conceptual intuitions are widely shared.5 
While the advocate of AECA holds that there is no need to empirically check whether their 
conceptual intuitions are widely shared, the advocate of NECA merely holds that empirical 
investigation is not typically needed. 
 Thus, our primary example of NECA, Frank Jackson, holds that it is fairly safe for a 
philosopher to generalize from her own conceptual intuitions. He holds that his intuitions, for 
example, generally coincide with the folk’s and thereby reveal the folk theory (1998, 32). 
Although Jackson does not feel that it is generally necessary to conduct empirical work to 
confirm that his conceptual intuitions are typical, he accepts that this is an empirical question: 
I am sometimes asked—in a tone that suggests that the question is a major objection—
why, if conceptual analysis is concerned to elucidate what governs our classificatory 
practice, don’t I advocate doing serious opinion polls on people’s responses to various 
cases? My answer is that I do—when it is necessary. Everyone who presents the Gettier 
cases to a class of students is doing their own bit of fieldwork, and we all know the 
                                                 
5 Just how widely shared a conceptual intuition must be is not clear in the literature; and, while this is an interesting 
and important question, it is not one that I can do justice to here. 
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answer they get in the vast majority of cases. But it is also true that often we know that 
our own case is typical and so can generalize from it to others. (36-37) 
 
Jackson suggests not only that empirical work on conceptual intuitions is seldom needed, but 
also implies that when it is needed, rather informal methods will suffice. Nonetheless, Jackson 
(and the advocates of NECA more generally) does not deny that empirical investigation has a 
role to play in conceptual analysis. In particular, we might reasonably infer that Jackson holds 
that one of the times when it will be necessary to employ serious opinion polls (and presumably 
actual experiments if called for), is when philosophical disputes arise concerning the primary 
meaning of a term occurring in a given employment of conceptual analysis. 
 
2. Anti-Empirical Conceptual Analysis 
Other advocates of conceptual analysis are even less open to the use of empirical methods to 
check whether one’s own conceptual intuitions are representative of those of the rest of the 
linguistic community. For example, Antti Kauppinen (2007, 95) both denies that the conceptual 
intuitions of the community can be “tested with methods of positivist social science” and asserts 
that philosophers are “entitled to appeal to intuitions about folk concepts in virtue of possessing 
implicit normative knowledge acquired through reflective participation in everyday linguistic 
practices.”  
Our primary example for AECA, Max Bennett and Peter Hacker, suggest an even sharper 
divide between the empirical and the conceptual. They begin their critique of language use in 
modern neuroscience by separating the empirical questions that occupy neuroscientists from the 
conceptual questions that philosophers are concerned with: 
Empirical questions about the nervous system are the province of neuroscience….  
By contrast, conceptual questions (concerning, for example, the concepts of mind or 
memory, thought or imagination), the description of the logical relations between 
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concepts (such as between the concepts of perception and sensation, or the concepts of 
consciousness and self-consciousness), and the examination of the structural relationships 
between distinct conceptual fields (such as between the psychological and the neural, or 
the mental and the behavioral) are the proper province of philosophy. (2003, 1) 
 
Bennett and Hacker then argue that the conceptual questions come prior to the empirical 
questions, writing:  
Conceptual questions antecede matters of truth and falsehood…. They determine not 
what is empirically true or false, but rather what does or does not make sense. Hence 
conceptual questions are not amenable to scientific investigation and experimentation or 
to scientific theorizing. For the concepts and conceptual relationships in question are 
presupposed by any such investigations and theorizing. (2003, 2) 
 
The claim that conceptual questions are not amenable to scientific investigation is a rather radical 
claim. Further, it is not clear why we should accept that a given concept cannot be the target of a 
scientific investigation. Specifically, it is unclear why the concept in question must be 
presupposed by such an investigation. Certainly the investigators will have to call on a host of 
other concepts in carrying out any scientific investigation; but, it does not follow that they must 
call on their understanding of the term in question to investigate the use of that term in the 
linguistic community. 
 Elsewhere, Bennett and Hacker seem to recognize this and instead endorse a more 
moderate claim. They suggest that it is not so much that concepts cannot be investigated 
empirically, but that such investigations are not needed. Consider their (2007) response to a 
suggestion by Daniel Dennett (2007): 
Professor Dennett suggests that to examine the use of words involves either a form of 
anthropology or a form of “autoanthropology.” For one has to discover the uses of words 
by doing appropriate social surveys, asking people to consult their intuitions on correct 
word usage. Alternatively, one has to consult one’s own intuitions; but then it might turn 
out that one’s intuitions diverge from those of others…. 
 
This is a misconception. A competent speaker of the language no more has to consult his 
intuitions (hunches, guesses) than a competent mathematician has to consult his intuitions 
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concerning the multiplication tables or a competent chess player has to consult his 
intuitions about the movements of chess pieces. (146–147) 
 
It is worth noting that Bennett and Hacker appear to be using the term “intuition” in a different 
sense than Dennett (and the sense employed in this article). In equating intuitions with hunches 
or guesses, they suggest a clear lack of certainty about an intuition on the part of the person who 
has it; but, Dennett is not suggesting that people feel uncertain about the meaning of common 
terms. Rather, he uses “intuition” in the sense of an unreflective intellectual seeming and, in this 
sense the mathematician is reasonably taken to be calling on an intuition when giving the answer 
to a simple multiplication problem. Further, in this case the intuition is readily justified and the 
correct answer will be obvious to anyone with basic competence in mathematics. The issue is 
whether the primary meanings of common terms can be similarly justified and are equally 
obvious. Bennett and Hacker seem to be claiming that this is the case for “competent speakers.” 
They suggest that while the meaning of a given term is an empirical question, it is a trivial one 
and one that a competent speaker has no need to engage with. 
 This claim critically rests on there being such “competent speakers” of the language to 
call on and our ability to recognize them as such (if we wish to avoid disputes). Unfortunately, 
Bennett and Hacker do not tell us much about how to do this. What they say is that “a competent 
speaker is one who has mastered the usage of the common expressions of the language” (2007, 
147). But, this suggests that we would need to know the correct use of these expressions in the 
first place if we wanted to establish that someone was actually a competent speaker of the 
language. In the absence of some non-question-begging way to establish who has truly mastered 
the usage of the common expressions of the language, however, it seems that we would need to 
first conduct some empirical work to determine the primary meanings of these expressions—
perhaps conducting the appropriate social surveys as Dennett suggests. This is most evident 
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when conceptual disputes arise between people that we would otherwise assume were competent 
speakers of the language. 
 
3. Conceptual Disputes between Seemingly Competent Speakers 
I hold that AECA is not a viable position, not because it cannot handle the rudder when the 
philosophical waters are smooth, but because it offers no compelling way of overcoming the 
waves of disagreement that occur. The problem is that AECA does not tell us what to do when 
two seemingly competent speakers have divergent conceptual intuitions about a philosophically 
interesting common term. Of course, one might hold that such disagreements could not occur (as 
Bennett and Hacker seem to suggest in responding to Dennett) or that if they did that the 
disagreements would be superficial could be resolved through further dialogue and reflection. 
But, what if we were to find ongoing disagreement between seemingly competent speakers about 
the primary meaning of a range of terms?  
I hold that AECA has no way to convincingly resolve such disputes between seemingly 
competent speakers of the language exactly because it denies that empirical investigation into 
how those terms are used has a role to play in conceptual analysis. The reason is that the 
available evidence—the disputants’ own conceptual intuitions—is insufficient to decide between 
them. Thus, it seems that for such a dispute to arise there must either be different primary 
meanings of a term (perhaps reflecting that we have lumped linguistic communities together that 
are best treated separately) or that one party in the dispute must be mistaken (and hence not 
actually a competent speaker of the language on Bennett and Hacker’s understanding of the 
phrase). Deciding which of these is the case will be critical for the conceptual analysis; but, the 
disputants’ own conceptual intuitions are clearly insufficient evidence for making a compelling 
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decision between these possibilities, as each intuition is countered by the other. Since it is the 
representativeness of the conceptual intuitions that is at issue, however, it seems that a 
compelling decision here will require moving beyond the disputants own intuitions and finding a 
standard by which to adjudicate between them. As such, I find that if such disputes occur, the 
advocate of conceptual analysis has little choice but to turn to an investigation of how members 
of the linguistic community actually use the common terms at issue. 
 Disputes over the primary meaning of ordinary terms do occur. In fact, at the heart of 
Bennett and Hacker’s critique of neuroscience is just such a dispute. They argue that 
psychological predicates only logically apply to (some) whole animals. But, of course, other 
philosophers disagree (I will take myself as an example of this); further, Bennett and Hacker’s 
critique itself indicates that many brain scientists disagree. Of course, aside from this dispute we 
do not have any reason to question the conceptual intuitions of these scientists or to doubt that 
these exceedingly well-educated researchers are competent speakers of the language. As such, 
the conceptual intuitions on either side of the dispute would seem to have equal standing at the 
outset; but, as they generate radically divergent conceptual analyses, we need some (non-
question-begging) way to decide between them. 
 
3.1 The Animal Restriction for Psychological Predicates 
Although Bennett and Hacker express a general unease with the use of psychological terms in 
contemporary neuroscience, their critique focuses on one supposed condition of application, the 
animal restriction noted above. They hold that psychological predicates—such as thinking, 
knowing, believing, seeing (2003, 71)—only logically apply to some whole living animals. 
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When this restriction is violated by applying a psychological predicate to a part of an animal, the 
user commits what Bennett and Hacker term “the mereological fallacy.”  
 As the animal restriction is the basis for this so-called fallacy, it is important to be very 
clear about the nature of this restriction. Two points are especially relevant. First, Bennett and 
Hacker are not simply saying that psychological predicates are primarily applied to living 
persons and some non-human animals, although we could perhaps discover other entities that 
they also apply to. Rather, they assert that it is part of the meaning of psychological predicates 
that they only apply to whole living animals. In other words, they hold that we could no more 
discover that a non-animal possessed one of these abilities, than we could discover a married 
bachelor. Second, the animal restriction is violated by the application of psychological predicates 
to parts of animals (resulting in the so-called mereological fallacy), but it is also violated by the 
application of psychological predicates to other non-animals. This is important to note because 
the empirical studies that I review in Section 4 and present in Section 5 concern entities that are 
neither animals nor parts of animals. Thus, while Bennett and Hacker primarily focus on 
violations of the animal restriction that are instances of the so-called mereological fallacy, the 
restriction is wider than this—as they realize (2007, 139). 
 What reasons do Bennett and Hacker offer for thinking that the primary meaning of 
psychological predicates includes the animal restriction? As should be expected from their 
commitment to AECA, they do not offer much. This restriction is simply supposed to follow 
from our conceptual intuitions about various psychological predicates as competent speakers of 
the language. Nonetheless, Bennett and Hacker do draw the restriction out by considering §281 
of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (1958). Bennett and Hacker write: 
Wittgenstein made a profound remark that bears directly on our concerns. “Only of a 
human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: It has 
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sensations; it sees, is blind; hears, is deaf; is conscious or unconscious.” This epitomizes 
the conclusions we shall reach in our investigation. (2003, 71) 
 
As it stands, Wittgenstein’s dictum (2007, 133) diverges from Bennett and Hacker’s animal 
restriction in a number of ways. In particular, Wittgenstein does not specify non-human animals 
as the only entities that might behave like human beings and he does not claim that his insight 
extends to all psychological predicates. As such, it is possible to both affirm Wittgenstein’s 
dictum and deny Bennett and Hacker’s animal restriction.6  
 Again, it seems that the case for the animal restriction rests on Bennett and Hacker’s 
conceptual intuitions about psychological predicates; but, their own critique illustrates that the 
conceptual intuitions of seemingly competent speakers of the language are not uniform here. We 
therefore have a clear conceptual dispute and have been given no way to resolve it. Given that 
the dispute concerns how widely held the different conceptual intuitions are in the linguistic 
community, it seems that the way to resolve the dispute is to conduct an empirical investigation. 
I illustrate how this can be done in Section 5 by considering one supposed violation of the animal 
restriction—the application of “calculate” to computers. 
 
3.2 The Application of “calculate” to Computers 
Consider the following claim: “‘The computer calculates’ means no more than ‘The computer 
goes through the electricomechanical processes necessary to produce the results of a calculation 
without any calculation’” (Bennett and Hacker, 2007, 152). Why should we think this? More 
specifically, why should we think that the literal application of “calculate” requires anything 
more than that a system goes through processes that reliably produce the results of calculations? 
Bennett and Hacker do not say. Rather, they assert that such language is metaphorical (or 
                                                 
6 This is essentially what Daniel Dennett (2007, 78) does, for example; see also Machamer and Sytsma (2005), 
Sytsma (2007).  
 14
perhaps a dead metaphor (152), although it is not clear how this would support their basic point7) 
and insist that true calculation involves a host of other psychological abilities that they claim 
computers cannot possess. Bennett and Hacker write: 
It is true that we do, in casual parlance, say that computers remember, that they search 
their memory, that they calculate and sometimes, when they take a long time, we 
jocularly say that they are thinking things over. But this is merely a facon de parler. It is 
not a literal application of the terms…. We use computers to produce the results of a 
calculation—just as we used to use a slide-rule or cylindrical mechanical calculator. 
Those results are produced without anyone or anything literally calculating—as is evident 
in the case of a slide-rule or mechanical calculator. In order literally to calculate, one 
must have a grasp of a wide range of concepts, follow a multitude of rules that one must 
know, and understand a variety of operations. Computers do not and cannot. (139) 
 
What I want to focus on in this passage is the claim that when we say that a computer calculates, 
we do not mean it literally.  
Bennett and Hacker apparently arrive at this conclusion by consulting their conceptual 
intuitions about the term, although they illustrate the point by considering other artifacts besides 
computers. Again, I have a different conceptual intuition: I am perfectly willing to say that 
“computers calculate” and I mean this literally. As such, I do not find Bennett and Hacker’s 
analogies compelling. I do not find them compelling, in part, because there seems to be an 
important difference between the cases: A slide-rule on its own is unable to go through the 
processes that produce the results of calculations, but a computer can go through the necessary 
processes given the appropriate initiating input. Certainly such an ability seems to be necessary 
for calculation; the question, however, was why we should think that it is not sufficient for 
calculation—and comparisons to entities that lack this ability are irrelevant to this question. 
 Thus, we have a conceptual dispute, with my conceptual intuitions about computers and 
the psychological predicate “calculates” diverging from Bennett and Hacker’s. How are we to 
                                                 
7 It is plausible that the term “calculate” was once restricted to human beings and only applied to machines 
metaphorically. Accepting this, however, it nonetheless seems that the death of the metaphor might well signal the 
lifting of the animal restriction for the term (see Camp, 2006, 161). 
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resolve this dispute? Although Bennett and Hacker have not offered any evidence for their claim 
that talk of “computers calculating” is meant figuratively (outside of their conceptual intuition), 
this does not necessarily mean that they are mistaken. Rather, I find that they make an empirical 
claim and the occurrence of dispute concerning it shows us that empirical evidence is needed. 
Furthermore, it is a claim that is readily tested. The results of three such tests are discussed in 
Section 5. Together, these studies indicate that, pace Bennett and Hacker, non-philosophers 
generally hold that “calculate” can be literally applied to computers. Before turning to that work, 
however, I want to briefly consider some recent experimental work that while not conducted to 
test Bennett and Hacker’s animal restriction, nonetheless suggests against it. 
 
4. Some Empirical Work relevant to the Animal Restriction 
As we saw above, Bennett and Hacker hold that the conditions of application for common 
expressions can be elicited from their standard employment in ordinary discourse. They also 
claim that one such rule for psychological predicates is that they only apply to whole living 
animals. If Bennett and Hacker’s conceptual intuitions, as competent speakers of the language, 
are a reliable guide to the primary meanings of common terms, then we should expect members 
of the linguistic community by and large to refuse to apply psychological predicates to entities 
that are not whole animals. In this section I review a number of studies in the growing 
experimental literature on the folk psychology of consciousness that show that English speakers 
are generally willing to apply some psychological predicates to some non-animals. 
In their pioneering paper, Joshua Knobe and Jesse Prinz (2008) investigated what types of 
psychological predicates people were willing to apply to group agents. In their second study they 
presented participants with sentences applying a psychological predicate to Acme Corporation. 
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Knobe and Prinz found that participants judged the sentences involving the psychological 
predicates “believes,” “intends,” “wants,” “knows,” and “decides” to sound natural, despite the 
fact that each one violates Bennett and Hacker’s animal restriction.8 These results are not a fluke 
and have been replicated (Sytsma and Machery, 2009). In another study, Bryce Huebner and 
colleagues (forthcoming) gave participants a series of sentences involving a range of group 
agents, asking them to rate how natural they sound on the same scale used by Knobe and Prinz. 
On average, participants found that each of the sentences involving an intentional psychological 
predicate sounded natural, giving high scores to sentences such as “Sony intends to release a new 
product in January to increase sales” (M=6.5) and “Destiny’s Child wants to put on a better show 
tomorrow night” (M=6.0). A similar result was found by Adam Arico (forthcoming). Further, 
Arico and colleagues (under review) conducted a study to test whether people found such 
ascriptions to be literal; they found that even after restricting the data set to participants who 
performed well on figurative test sentences, most judged the sentences ascribing psychological 
predicates to group agents to be literally true. 
It appears that people are willing to ascribe psychological predicates like “believes” and 
“knows” to some group agents. Furthermore, as group agents are not whole living animals, these 
findings suggest against Bennett and Hacker’s animal restriction.  
Edouard Machery and I (under review) have shown a similar result for a wholly different 
sort of non-animal—a simple robot. In one of the cases in our first study, participants were given 
a vignette describing a relatively simple robot that discriminated between three colored boxes, 
correctly moving the red one when so instructed, and were asked whether the robot “saw red” on 
a scale from 1 (“clearly no”) to 7 (“clearly yes”). We found that non-philosophers were generally 
                                                 
8 Participants were asked to rate each sentence on a scale from 1 (“sounds weird”) to 7 (“sounds natural”). Sentences 
included “Acme Corporation believes that its profit margin will soon increase” (M= 6.1) and “Acme Corporation 
intends to release a new product this January” (M= 6.3). 
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willing to attribute seeing to the robot (M=5.2). In a previously unreported follow-up, Jonathan 
Livengood and I ran a variation on this probe, removing anthropomorphic language and 
changing the target color to blue. We again found that participants were generally willing to 
ascribe seeing to the robot (M=5.1). In another study, Huebner (in press) gave participants 
vignettes describing one of four systems—a human, a cyborg with a human body but a robot 
brain, a cyborg with a robot body but a human brain, and a robot. He found that participants were 
willing to ascribe beliefs to the robot (such as the belief that 2 + 2 = 4 or that triangles have three 
sides) and there was no significant difference in this regards between the robot case and the other 
three systems.  
 As a robot is not a whole living animal, these results further indicate that people do not 
feel bound by Bennett and Hacker’s animal restriction. Again, we have preliminary empirical 
evidence that it is false that people are only willing to apply psychological predicates to whole 
living animals. 
 
5. Studies on the Application of “calculate” to Computers 
It is unlikely that the studies described in the previous section will convince dedicated advocates 
of AECA, like Bennett and Hacker, that some of their conceptual intuitions are not 
representative. The most likely reply is to argue that the participants surveyed in those studies 
understood the psychological predicates figuratively. Alternatively, the advocate of AECA might 
argue that participants’ responses do not reflect the “robust intuitions” that are at issue and that 
dialogue and reflection are needed to elicit these (Kauppinen, 2007). This might be reasonable 
for some philosophical thought experiments, but it is far from clear that it is reasonable for 
judgments about relatively straightforward sentences like the one given above. 
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 Regardless, I hold that careful empirical investigation can overcome these worries. I 
illustrate this by presenting the results of three studies conducted to test one potential violation of 
the animal restriction that Bennett and Hacker consider. As seen in Section 3, they hold that 
computers cannot literally calculate. Are they representative of the linguistic community in this? 
As Bennett and Hacker seem to recognize that people are willing to say that computers calculate, 
the primary concern is whether this is meant literally or not. To test whether people find 
statements like “some computers can calculate” to be literal, we might simply ask them directly. 
One worry with this approach is that people, on average, might be rather poor at recognizing 
figurative language. This can be controlled for by including a range of test sentences, both literal 
and figurative, with the target sentence. This is what I did in my first study.  
 
5.1 Study 1 
I gave participants a total of nine sentences, counterbalanced for order. In addition to the target 
sentence, they were given four non-literal and four literal sentences (two true and two false).9 For 
each sentence the participant was asked to indicate both whether they thought it was true or false 
and whether it was literal or non-literal. Each question was answered on a 7-point scale. The first 
was anchored at 1 with “clearly false,” at 4 with “not sure,” and at 7 with “clearly true”; the 
second was anchored at 1 with “clearly non-literal,” at 4 with “not sure,” and at 7 with “clearly 
literal.” The study was administered in a classroom setting to 33 undergraduates at the University 
of Pittsburgh. Two participants were removed (one because she did not clearly answer the 
questions, one because the biographical information was incomplete). The remaining 31 
participants were 61.3% female, ranging in age from 18 to 43, and with an average age of 20.2. 
                                                 
9 Sentences were derived from Wolff and Gentner (2000) and Glucksberg et al. (1982). 
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The mean responses and standard deviation for each of the nine sentences are shown in 
parentheses after the sentences below (false/true; non-literal/literal) and graphically in Figure 1. 
1. “Some computers can calculate.” (M=6.55, SD=1.179; M=6.00, SD=1.844) 
2. “Some birds are mammals.” (M=3.65, SD=2.550; M=5.52, SD=2.158) 
3. “Some gifts can be returned.” (M=6.65, SD=0.709; M=5.06, SD=2.250) 
4. “Some bachelors are married.” (M=3.77, SD=2.305; M=3.10, SD=2.300) 
5. “Some windows can open.” (M=6.52, SD=1.262; M=5.45, SD=2.014) 
6. “Some jobs are jails.” (M=5.77, SD=1.521; M=2.03, SD=1.506) 
7. “Some rumors can be viruses.” (M=6.13, SD=1.118; M=2.03, SD=1.871) 
8. “Some libraries are goldmines.” (M=5.97, SD=1.354; M=2.19, SD=2.120) 




Figure 1: Study 1, results (error bars: 95% confidence intervals). 
 
 
The mean responses for the eight comparison questions were largely as expected, with the 
exception of the false-literal sentence—“some bachelors are married”—being judged non-
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literal.10 Further, while each of the four figurative sentences were judged to be non-literal, the 
target sentence—“some computers can calculate”—was judged to be literal; in fact, it received 
the highest score for literalness out of the nine sentences. Planned analyses revealed that the 
mean for the literalness question for the target sentence was significantly above the neutral point 
of 4 (t(30)=6.039; p<0.001 (two-tailed)), significantly different from the means for each of the 
four figurative test questions11, and that the means for the four figurative test questions were each 
significantly below the neutral point of 412. 
Furthermore, if we restrict the data set to the 19 out of 31 participants who correctly 
identified the four figurative sentences as being non-literal (answering 1, 2, or 3 for each), the 
target sentence still has the highest score for literalness out of the nine sentences (M=5.89). 
Likewise, a planned analysis revealed that the mean for the target question remains significantly 
above the neutral point of 4 (t(18)=4.256; p<0.001 (two-tailed)). As seen in Figure 2, these 
participants clearly distinguished between the target sentence and the four figurative sentences. 
Further, no significant difference for the target question was seen between the means for the 
participants who correctly identified the figurative sentences and the participants who did not 
(t(29)=0.394; p=0.696 (two-tailed)). 
                                                 
10 Planned analysis showed that the mean for this question was significantly below the neutral point of 4 (t(30)=-
2.186; p=0.037 (two-tailed)). This might be because recognizing that the statement is literally false, participants 
sought a metaphorical meaning. Unlike the other literal-false sentence—“some birds are mammals”—a figurative 
understanding readily presents itself: As one participant indicated in the margin of the survey, some bachelors are 
married to their jobs. 
11 Jobs jails: t(30)=8.897, p<0.001 (two-tailed); rumors viruses: t(30)=8.945, p<0.001 (two-tailed); libraries 
goldmines: t(30)=7.106, p<0.001 (two-tailed); lies boomerang: t(30)=6.950, p<0.001 (two-tailed). 
12 Jobs jails: t(30)=-7.025, p<0.001 (two-tailed); rumors viruses: t(30)=-5.587, p<0.001 (two-tailed); libraries 
goldmines: t(30)=-4.744, p<0.001 (two-tailed); lies boomerang: t(30)=-4.465, p<0.001 (two-tailed). 
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Figure 2: Literalness scores for participants correctly identifying the four figurative 
sentences as non-literal. (Error bars: 95% confidence intervals.) 
 
5.2 Study 2 
While the results of the first study indicate against Bennett and Hacker’s contention that 
ascriptions of “calculate” to computers are typically meant figuratively, one might object that 
being able to recognize figurative language is a different skill than being able to use it. This 
distinction might be used to argue that the results of the first study do not reflect how participants 
understand the term because the study relied on participants’ passive judgments about the 
sentence rather than actively engaging them in articulating its meaning. One way to control for 
this is to ask participants to paraphrase sentences that include the term “calculates.” If people 
understand the term differently when it is applied to a computer than when it is applied to a 
 22
human (because in one case they find it to be figurative and in the other case literal), then we 
should expect this to be reflected in how they paraphrase the term in these divergent contexts.13 
This is the approach taken in my second study. I gave participants one of the following 
two sentences and asked them to paraphrase it: 
(1) “The cashier calculated John’s total at the supermarket.” 
(2) “The cash register calculated John’s total at the supermarket.” 
 
The study was administered in a classroom setting to 65 undergraduates at the University of 
Pittsburgh. Eight participants were removed because they did not clearly paraphrase the target 
term. The remaining 57 participants were 64.9% female, ranging in age from 18 to 22, and with 
an average age of 20.0. Of those, 27 paraphrased the first sentence, while 30 paraphrased the 
second. Coding the terms used for “calculated” and aggregating related variations14, there was 
close agreement between the terms used for the two sentences.15 In fact, the only term for which 
there was poor agreement was “rang up” and this paraphrase plausibly suggests the opposite of 
Bennett and Hacker’s claim—it seems to suggest that it was the cash register, and not the 
                                                 
13 This approach was suggested by Mark Phelan. See Phelan (under review) for a discussion of paraphrasing 
figurative language. 
14 For example, “added up” was aggregated with “added” and “added together”; while “summed” was aggregated 
with “summed up,” “took the sum,” and “produced the sum.” 
15 This was tested using a logistic regression with the agent (cashier or cash register) treated as the response and the 
paraphrase given for “calculated” as a categorical predictor. The model was 
 
logit(π) = β0 + β1I1 + β2I2 + β3I3 + β4I4 + ε 
 
where I1 is 1 if the description was “Summed” and 0 otherwise, I2 is 1 if the description was “Figured Out” and 0 
otherwise, I3 is 1 if the description was “Rang Up” and 0 otherwise, and I4 is 1 if the description was “Determined” 
and 0 otherwise. The intercept gives the estimate for “Added Up.” A likelihood ratio test accepts the hypothesis that 
β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = 0. The p-value of the test is 0.5298 (the chi-square test statistic was 3.17 with four degrees of 
freedom). Furthermore, the point estimate for β0 is 0.0000 and the local p-value of the test that β0 = 0 is 1.0000. 
What this means is that the odds ratio of “cashier” to “cash register” is 1:1 and none of the responses is a significant 
predictor. So, knowing the way a person paraphrased “calculated” does not help you to predict whether the sentence 
they were given was about a cashier or a cash register. 
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cashier, that actually calculated the total. The number of participants using each of the top five 
terms is shown in Figure 3.16  
 
Figure 3: Study 2, results (top five answers shown). 
 
 
The close agreement between the paraphrases given for “calculates” when applied to the human 
and the computer indicates that the participants did not understand the term differently in these 
two contexts. Assuming that the application of the term to the human is meant literally, this is 
then evidence that the application to the computer is also meant literally. 
 
5.3 Study 3 
The first two studies provide rather clear evidence that people do not generally treat the 
application of “calculates” to a computer as being figurative. The advocate of AECA might 
                                                 
16 Additional terms not shown were “find out,” “totaled,” “came up with,” “formulated,” and “processed” with six 
occurrences for paraphrases of the second sentence (two for “find out” and one each for the other terms) and none 
for the first sentence. 
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nonetheless hold that these studies only elicited “surface intuitions” (as opposed to the “robust 
intuitions” at issue; Kauppinen, 2007) and that on further reflection (perhaps aided by 
philosophical dialogue) their conceptual intuitions would come to match Bennett and Hacker’s. 
In response, one might worry that philosophical dialogue simply amounts to training; and, of 
course, people can be trained to answer such questions differently than they originally do, but 
this would simply show that they can be taught a different meaning for the term. Nonetheless, if 
untrained participants have robust intuitions about the application of “calculates” to computers 
that can be elicited and that diverge from their surface intuitions, then we should expect that 
those participants who show greater cognitive reflection should tend to give divergent answers to 
questions drawing on those intuitions than participants who show less cognitive reflection. 
Fortunately this is something that can be tested using a standard psychological 
instrument—the cognitive reflection test (CRT) developed by Shane Frederick (2005). Frederick 
notes that many researchers have distinguished between those cognitive processes that are 
executed quickly, with little to no conscious deliberation, and those that are slower and involve 
deliberation and reflection. He developed the CRT as a simple measure of a person’s tendency to 
employ the latter type of processes over the former. The test involves three problems that are 
relatively easy, but for which there is an intuitive but incorrect answer (each correct answer is 
worth 1 point, giving a scale of 0 to 3 for the test). It seems reasonable to associate the impulsive 
answer on these questions with what Kauppinen calls “surface intuitions”; if this is correct, then 
we can use CRT scores as an indicator of the likelihood that a person will reflect on a problem, 
potentially moving past their surface intuition if it diverges from their robust intuition. 
In my third study I gave 70 participants in a classroom setting at the University of 
Pittsburgh the CRT along with a vignette about a computerized cash register followed by five 
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sentences about it. The participants were 42.9% female, ranging in age from 18 to 43, and with 
an average age of 21.7. For each sentence participants were asked whether it was true or false 
and whether it was literal or non-literal (using the same 7-point scales as in Study 1). The 
vignette read: 
It is an ordinary Saturday morning and Mary is at the supermarket picking up 
some groceries. When she went to check out there were lines in every lane that 
had a human cashier; several of the new “self checkout” lanes had no wait, 
however. In the self checkout lane, there is an item scanner attached to a cash 
register: You scan your items and when you are done the cash register displays 
how much you owe and takes your payment (having slots for cash or credit carts).  
 
Mary had never used one of these self checkout lanes before and was a bit 
nervous about doing so. Nonetheless, she didn’t want to wait in line and decided 
to give it a try. Everything went fairly smoothly: Mary scanned the items in and 
the cash register displayed her total. It took Mary a while to find her credit card to 
pay, however, and after a minute the cash register started to beep. When Mary 
inserted her credit card, the beeping stopped. Mary finished paying with no 
further trouble. Overall, Mary thought the self checkout lane worked quite well 
and thought that she would use it again. 
 
The mean responses and standard deviations for each of the sentences are shown in parentheses 
after the sentences below (false/true; non-literal/literal) and graphically in Figure 4. 
1. “The cash register calculated Mary’s total.” (M=6.59, SD=0.940; M=6.20, SD=1.638) 
2. “The cash register is a computer.” (M=6.57, SD=1.149; M=5.96, SD=1.601) 
3. “The cash register knew how much each item cost.” (M=5.37, SD=2.310; M=3.87, SD=2.553) 
4. “The cash register desires money.” (M=3.47, SD=2.370; M=2.63, SD=2.107) 
5. “The cash register was angry when Mary didn’t pay.” (M=2.51, SD=2.090; M=1.94, SD=1.895)  
 
As in the first study, participants on average judged the sentence ascribing “calculates” to the 
cash register as being both true and literal. Planned analysis revealed that the mean response for 
the literalness of the sentence was significantly above the neutral point of 4 (t(69)=11.235, 
p<0.001 (two-tailed)). Further, participants judged that the application of two of the other 
psychological predicates to the cash register were both false and non-literal (“desires,” “angry”). 
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Interestingly, participants treated “the cash register knew how much each item cost” as true but 
were split on whether it was literal or not. 
 
Figure 4: Study 3, results (error bars: 95% confidence intervals). 
 
 
If the “robust intuitions” hypothesis were correct, then we would expect participants with 
higher CRT scores to be more likely to treat the ascription of “calculates” to the cash register as 
either false or figurative. This is not what we find, however. In fact, CRT score shows a slight 
positive correlation with the responses for both the truth and literalness of the target sentence 
(truth: r(70)=0.056, p=0.648, r²=0.003; literalness: r(70)=0.263, p=0.028, r²=0.069). Put another 
way, more reflective participants are not more likely to deny that a computerized cash register 
could literally calculate than less reflective participants. 
Taken together, these three studies are compelling evidence against Bennett and Hacker’s 
claim that the primary meaning of “calculates” includes the animal restriction. The evidence 
suggests that by and large people are not only willing to apply the term to computers, but that 
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they mean it literally. More importantly than simply showing that Bennett and Hacker are 
mistaken in this case, however, these studies illustrate how empirical investigation can help 
resolve conceptual disputes, thereby aiding the practice of conceptual analysis. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Accepting that conceptual analysis has some role to play in modern philosophy, there are 
important methodological questions to be asked about its employment. I have focused here on 
the relevance of empirical investigation to conceptual analysis. I have argued against those 
thinkers who hold that empirical investigation is irrelevant to conceptual analysis, showing that it 
gives us a needed means for resolving the philosophical disputes that arise with regard to the 
primary meaning of terms for folk concepts. I illustrated this by considering one such dispute. 
 Having seen that empirical investigation can play a needed role in conceptual analysis, it 
is worth asking how widely it should be employed and how it should be carried out. These are 
difficult questions that I cannot answer here. Nonetheless, I find that the case against AECA 
suggests a moral for NECA. Specifically, it suggests that if one is going to employ conceptual 
analysis, then it is good practice to conduct formal empirical investigations of the key terms used 
in the analysis.  
Recognizing that disputes can arise and that some seemingly competent speakers of the 
language have conceptual intuitions that are not representative of the intuitions of the larger 
linguistic community, each of us has reason to at least entertain the possibility that some of our 
conceptual intuitions are not representative and that reliance on them could generate non-
substantive philosophical disputes. Assuming that avoiding such philosophical disputes is good 
practice in philosophy, then it will be good practice to conduct empirical investigations more 
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liberally in conceptual analysis than the advocate of NECA seems to suggest (see Section 1). 
Furthermore, if the goal is to avoid the unnecessary philosophical disputes that can arise in 
employing conceptual analysis, then I find that the rather informal methods suggested by Frank 
Jackson (1998, 36-37) will not suffice. The reason is that they do not control for a number of 
well-known biases. In particular, when Jackson suggests that simply presenting cases to a class 
of students is to do the necessary empirical work, he is ignoring the possibility that his 
philosophy students might feel pressure to express support for the response that Jackson is 
looking for or that his own bias might influence his perception of the assent of his students; but, 
the possibility of these biases render such casual fieldwork rather unconvincing. Bluntly, 
informal methods (such as a show of hands in an introductory philosophy class) are likely to be 
too informal to be compelling in cases of actual dispute. And, as the goal of the work is to 
resolve the dispute, this is good reason to turn to the more rigorous methods employed, for 
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